The constitutional referendum, which representatives of the authorities at various levels and directions spoke about so insistently, has taken place.
However, its results, which some find convincing and others predictable, carry significant risks for the existing power, as indicated by the article on exclusive.kz.
On the one hand, the authorities can now confidently refute any hints at their "illegitimacy," which allows them to close the questions regarding possible "urgent early" changes. Conspiracy theories about President Tokayev's potential departure to the UN, although still discussed online, do not lose their relevance and sometimes appear in major global media, despite the low likelihood of their realization.
President Tokayev, after casting his ballot, noted that "some experts claim there is increasing competition within the power structure and other alarming trends. However, there is no reason for concern, and this will not negatively affect society." It is important to note that during several months of discussions about the Constitution (which was often confused with a "nationwide vote"), everything was done to dispel doubts about internal competition within the power and create the illusion of its unity.
On the other hand, if the situation in the country, especially in the economic sphere, deteriorates sharply, the question of radical changes in the power structure may arise again. Kazakhstan's economy is currently extremely vulnerable, and the executive branch's response to emerging risks does not inspire optimism among experts or ordinary citizens. Thus, the high level of approval for the new Constitution in the referendum becomes important for the ruling class – now they can claim that the people chose this path themselves, and we are all in the same boat. An alternative could have been the adoption of a new Constitution through parliament, followed by its dissolution and a transition to the Kurultai. However, the nationwide vote creates a sense that "we, the people of Kazakhstan," have, in a certain sense, become hostages to the conditions of this social contract.
The question is whether this contract will be honored by both parties. The answer depends primarily on the authorities, who now lose their last justifications for their mistakes and "excesses," which they traditionally referred to, pointing to the "legacy of old Kazakhstan," "sabotage," and "behind-the-scenes forces." This was, in fact, what the president spoke about at a recent meeting with representatives of the maslikhats.
Although "Nazarbayev's" Kazakhstan has not actually disappeared, legally it no longer exists – only Zhana Kazakhstan remains. And this obliges its creators to take certain actions. Why is this important? Kazakhstan is traditionally considered a country with a strong presidential system, where the head of state has broad powers.
The president is responsible for key areas of domestic and foreign policy, forms the government, and exerts significant influence on parliament. Thus, the country is transforming from a Nazarbayev-style super-presidential republic into a Tokayev-style one, which, however, still retains many features of its predecessor.
This implies that in the near future we will see not so much radical as institutional changes in the power structure, as well as a "cosmetic renovation" under the new "client." Politically, a number of new parties may emerge, as the existing "party formations" (including the renamed "party of the parliamentary majority") are inherited from "old Kazakhstan."
They need to create a counterbalance that will appear more convincing in the eyes of society than the current "pseudo-opposition" in parliament. This will also help solve an important task for Tokayev – to ensure full manageability of the elites, especially at the local level.
In particular, a conditional regional party representing the interests of local elites may be formed. It should be noted that the previously existing Senate was created to lobby for regional interests but failed to fulfill this task. It will be difficult for the little-understood Halyk Kenesi, which apparently will serve as a "conveyor" for the legislative initiatives of the higher and executive authorities, so that they do not lose face over minor issues.
Such a political tool of power is not just needed; it is extremely important. Otherwise, local elites sitting in the maslikhats (whose functions have now been significantly expanded, and where influence is exerted by the former local "nobility") may become a serious centrifugal force. Let us recall that after the tragic events in Korday, the first deputy head of the Presidential Administration, Maulen Ashimbayev, called for a thorough study of the inter-elite and inter-ethnic situation in the regions to understand the effectiveness of public institutions and the further development of these structures. Later, as the speaker of the Senate, he also actively dealt with regional issues. Who knows, perhaps he will become the leader of the Regional Party and the toraq of the future Kurultai?
Nevertheless, it is not only about personalities but also about institutions. The new parliamentary corps, based on party lists, makes sense only as a "launch pad" for creating a competitive political market – a real multi-party system, not just "spilled" from one structure into different parties with various "labels." After all, President Tokayev himself spoke about the need for such changes right after Kantar.
Although today the rhetoric of the authorities has changed, the task of finding inter-elite consensus remains relevant. It has been temporarily pushed to the background, but sooner or later it will re-emerge: power becomes stable and effective only when it can ensure inter-elite balance. And only on this basis can a cabinet of ministers be formed that will manage the economy effectively, support business, and avoid socially irresponsible decisions.
It is clear that all changes will not happen instantly. Constitutional reforms in the world never lead to immediate results in politics and, even more so, in the economy – at best, they set new rules of the game in the form of a "social contract." After the first referendum on the Constitution in 1995, the authorities quickly ignored many obligations outlined in this contract, as they had the trump card of high raw material prices, allowing them to resolve social conflicts with money.
Today, the situation for the Kazakh ruling class has changed radically, and not for the better. The realization of this, as well as the impossibility of returning to the comfortable conditions of the previous "fat" years, as the president noted at the aforementioned briefing after the vote, forced him to start working on a new Constitution about two years ago.
After the first referendum under Tokayev, the old elite (the so-called "collective Nazarbayev") remained, although it lost formal powers. Now that the "Nazarbayev" Constitution no longer exists, the new Basic Law represents an attempt to lay the foundation for a "collective Tokayev" – a new ruling elite. At the same time, many critics of the authorities argue that Tokayev's constitution "ceases to be perceived as a social contract and turns into a safety mechanism protecting the power from possible questions about the past." However, without such "insurance," the current power becomes vulnerable and increases risks for all of Kazakhstan, especially in light of growing external threats, which Kasyim-Zhomart Kemelovich mentions, referring to the "new geopolitical reality." In particular, pressure from our northern neighbor is intensifying.
Thus, the Constitution-2026, on the one hand, is far from the ideal dreamed of by part of society, and on the other hand, is the result of a difficult choice between the unacceptable and the unpleasant. The authorities have made their choice, and society has no choice but to accept it.
The post "Is the 'collective Tokayev' replacing the 'collective Nazarbayev'?" first appeared on K-News.
