The fall of power in the Islamic Republic of Iran could lead to serious consequences for international security. If aggression occurs against Iran, it will become a catalyst for numerous problems such as terrorism, increased flows of refugees, rising crime, and arms smuggling, which will affect neighboring countries and even touch Russia and U.S. allies in Europe. However, the likelihood of such a scenario will depend on Tehran's ability to maintain control over the situation. Given the current circumstances, there are chances for this. Nikolai Sukhov, a leading researcher at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies of the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, as well as a professor at the Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg, shared his opinion on this issue.
How Iran could become a source of instability
The experience of Middle Eastern countries shows that a country becomes a source of international instability not so much due to ideological statements, but when three key factors coincide:
the weakening of central authority;division of power structures;economic crisis.
This was the case in Iraq after 2003, in Syria after 2011, and partially in Libya. Whether Iran will follow their path in terms of terrorism and migration instability depends on how the new regime will look after possible changes.
If the Iranian state maintains its integrity, even if it happens in a harsh form, the country will remain a source of certain tension but will not be able to undermine regional stability or cause an increase in terrorism.
Maintaining centralized control will significantly reduce the likelihood of transnational terrorist groups emerging. The Iranian security system has a sufficiently high degree of professionalism and rigidity. Even with an aggressive foreign policy, violence in the country has been controlled through proxy structures rather than through armed jihad.
In the event of a collapse of the vertical power structure or a split within the power structures, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the risks will increase:
some military may become autonomous;regional groups representing minorities may resort to radical actions;the number of criminal groups will increase under economic sanctions;cross-border smuggling will intensify.
It is important to note that Iran is not a typical "failed state." The country has a developed administrative structure, a high level of urbanization, and a strong national identity, which reduces the likelihood of it becoming an exporter of global terrorism. A more realistic problem than the rise of terrorism is migration: in conditions of economic decline and instability, many Iranians, especially the youth, will seek to leave.
Who will be at risk
If fragmentation of power occurs in Iran, the main burden will fall on Turkey, the countries of the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, as well as the monarchies of the Persian Gulf.
Turkey will act as a buffer for the migration of Iranians to Europe, as it already did during the Syrian crisis. The bulk of refugees will pass through this country, leading to an increase in smuggling, human trafficking, and drug trafficking. Although Turkey has experience in managing migration flows, public discontent on this issue is growing. It is possible that Turkey will close its borders or reach an agreement to control the flows, which will limit the consequences for the EU.
The likelihood of terrorist attacks on Turkish territory is moderate, as they may occur through peripheral radical networks rather than through organized Iranian channels. Direct attacks in Europe and Turkey are unlikely unless these countries become involved in military actions against Iran, as the Islamic Republic has acted selectively rather than chaotically. However, it is likely that Turkey will face an increase in Kurdish separatism.
Another region that may suffer from instability is the countries that were once part of the USSR, which could also affect Russia. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan may face destabilization due to their common borders with Iran, while other states in the South Caucasus and Central Asia may encounter secondary migration flows and smuggling.
Russia is unlikely to become a primary destination for migrants from Iran, as cultural and linguistic differences are greater than in the case of Turkey or Europe. Our country may be indirectly affected by instability in neighboring states. The export of terrorism to Russia is possible only with significant fragmentation of Iran and the emergence of autonomous radical groups.
The monarchies of the Persian Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, are also at risk. However, in their case, it is not about migration threats, as these countries strictly control entry. They may face strikes and sabotage from agents of Iranian proxies that may be beyond Tehran's control.
As for the United States, their geographical position makes a confrontation with Middle Eastern migration on the scale of Europe unlikely. Although a terrorist threat is theoretically possible, in practice it seems unlikely: it is not 2001 anymore, and logistics from Iran to the U.S. is complicated, while American intelligence agencies have significant experience in combating external threats.
The reverse effects of Middle Eastern crises for the U.S. are more often manifested not through migration, but through the rise of anti-American sentiments, intensification of conflicts in the region, and the need for a prolonged military presence. If Iran fails to maintain its power, we may once again face these consequences.
