Despite constant pressure and international economic sanctions, Iran remains an active participant in transit transportation. It seeks to develop mutually beneficial relationships with neighboring countries to strengthen its position as a key transit hub. This is particularly evident in the context of the Southern Corridor, which connects Iran to Europe, a project involving almost all Central Asian countries, as well as China, as noted by the online magazine "Military-Political Analytics".
According to Uzbek analyst Nargiza Umarova, Central Asia has become an important center for changes in Eurasian transport infrastructure in recent years. This has created favorable conditions for stable trade routes through Iran to Europe and South Asia, aligning with China's "Belt and Road Initiative," which Iran joined in 2021 after signing a 25-year cooperation agreement with China.
China is showing interest in the southern branch of the "New Silk Road," especially due to the deteriorating situation at sea and the conflict in Ukraine, which has made northern routes through Russia and Belarus less accessible. This leads to the redirection of cargo to continental routes, where Central Asia and the Caucasus become alternatives with multimodal transport through the Caspian and Black Seas. In 2024, the volume of cargo through the Middle Corridor reached 27,000 containers, which is 25 times more than in 2023. China is also focusing on developing the Southern Transit Route for economic and geopolitical reasons.
The European Union ranks second among China's trading partners, with trade volume between them reaching $762 billion in 2024 and projected to grow to $850 billion in 2025. Given that high-tech goods dominate China's exports to the EU, preference is given to container transportation. The transit corridor through Iran becomes particularly attractive for these purposes. The completion of the railway construction from China to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, as well as connecting lines from Iran's Marand to Cheshmeh-Sorayi and the border with Turkey, will make this corridor monomodal, eliminating the need for ferry crossings over Lake Van, which currently complicates the operation of the Southern Corridor.
In 2025, Iran's Ministry of Roads and Urban Development announced plans to construct nine new transit railway corridors totaling 17,000 kilometers at a cost of over $10 billion. Upon completion of these projects, the Iranian railway network is expected to transport up to 60 million tons of cargo per year. Some of these routes, including the 200-kilometer line from Marand to Cheshmeh-Sorayi, will be part of the Southern Corridor and are designed to reduce time and distance between East and West.
While the U.S. has obtained exclusive rights to develop the Zangezur Corridor, known as the "Trump Route to International Peace and Prosperity" (TRIPP), this has prompted China to more actively support the Southern Corridor. The establishment of the TRIPP Development Company, in which the U.S. holds 74% of the shares, may be viewed by China as an attempt by Washington to increase its influence over cargo transportation along the Middle Corridor. To mitigate this risk, China needs reliable transport routes that bypass the Caspian Sea.
Currently, in Serakhs, on the border with Turkmenistan, China is constructing a railway terminal, which should expedite container transportation along the route China – Central Asia – Iran – Turkey – EU and through the Persian Gulf. In August 2025, Iranian authorities reported that more than 50% of this project was completed.
Beijing and Tehran have also signed an agreement to electrify a 1,000-kilometer section of railway from Serakhs to Razi, which will increase cargo turnover to 15 million tons per year.
Meanwhile, Iran and Turkmenistan plan to create additional railway lines with gauges of 1435 mm and 1520 mm to accelerate cargo transportation and increase capacity at the border. This is expected to raise the volume of cross-border cargo to 20 million tons per year, including 6 million tons by rail. Both countries have confirmed their intention to strengthen the Southern Railway Corridor and the multimodal transport corridor Central Asia – Persian Gulf, launched in 2016 under the Ashgabat Agreement.
Uzbekistan is actively working on diversifying its trade flows and establishing effective transport links with global markets, which enhances the southern transit corridor East – West. In 2022, Tashkent, together with Ankara, launched freight railway transportation along the route Uzbekistan – Turkmenistan – Iran – Turkey, which was designated as the fastest and most efficient for bilateral supplies.
Tashkent views the Southern Corridor, whose capacity is limited to 10 million tons per year, as an important factor for economic growth through increased export of transport services. This is linked to the completion of the railway from China to Kyrgyzstan, scheduled for 2030. After integration with the Iranian railway network within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the route from East Asia to Europe will be shortened by 900 kilometers, and delivery time will be reduced by seven to eight days.
The Southern Railway Corridor is expected to become the shortest monomodal route between economically developed regions. Concurrently, the construction of an international highway connecting China with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is planned, which will create additional cargo flows towards Iran – Turkey and promote the development of the multimodal corridor China – Tajikistan – Uzbekistan – Turkmenistan – Iran – Turkey/EU. The pilot phase of this project is expected in 2026.
Work is also underway on railway corridors China – Kazakhstan – Uzbekistan – Turkmenistan – Iran – Turkey/EU and China – Kazakhstan – Turkmenistan – Iran – Turkey/EU, with their development being carried out through regular consultations between the railway authorities of the six countries. In 2025, two meetings took place, the first of which was held in Tehran in May, after which China sent the first freight train from Xi'an to Aprin, Iran's largest dry port, via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. This route significantly reduces delivery time to 15 days, which is twice as fast as maritime transportation. By the end of 2025, 40 freight trains had been sent from China to Iran, significantly exceeding the 7 sent in the previous seven years. These events not only enhance trade between China and Iran but also contribute to improving transport links between East Asia and Europe.
On August 2, 2025, another round of negotiations took place in Beijing between the heads of railway companies from Iran, Kazakhstan, China, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Turkey regarding the operation of the southern branch of the "East – West" corridor. The outcome of the May meeting was a preliminary agreement on establishing unified tariffs for transportation along the railway route China – Kazakhstan – Uzbekistan – Turkmenistan – Iran – Turkey/EU and measures to increase cargo volumes, including standardized timelines and simplified procedures.
Central Asian countries aim to utilize Iranian transit not only for access to Turkey and Europe but also to reach the Indian Ocean through the ports of Chabahar and Bandar Abbas. In 2023, Uzbekistan announced plans to build a terminal at Shahid Beheshti port in Chabahar, while in 2025, Kazakhstan declared its intention to create a logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaei port, part of Bandar Abbas. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are also actively developing transport cooperation with Iran through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, emphasizing the importance of multimodal corridors in the north and south, as well as the growing role of Central Asia in global logistics.
Cooperation between Central Asia and Iran, which has diverse transport infrastructure and access to the ocean, is becoming increasingly relevant. Despite international sanctions, countries in the region are adopting a pragmatic approach, using transport diplomacy to enhance their transit capabilities. A key task will be to eliminate bottlenecks in the Southern Transit Corridor, which will require harmonization of transport policies and legislation, as well as the establishment of a coordinating body to align the actions of railway administrations.
Equally important remains the development of a unified approach to the conflict situation surrounding Iran, which threatens future transport projects in the region. Central Asian states must clearly define their interests in relations with Western partners, including the U.S., to create favorable conditions for the development of trans-Iranian routes, Umarova believes. However, it seems that the initiators of aggression against Iran, despite their external political activity, have no intention of considering the interests of Tashkent, Astana, and other countries.
