The Financial Times reports that both Russian and Ukrainian drone manufacturers are sourcing components from the same Chinese firms.
Chinese companies are doing everything possible to synchronize delivery schedules for their Russian and Ukrainian clients.
The publication notes that both sides receive new parts simultaneously. "If we notice a new video transmitter in Russian drones, we can immediately identify which Chinese company produced it," says Alexey Babenko from the Ukrainian company Vyriy Drone. "We reach out to them, and although they initially deny their involvement, they eventually agree to sell it to us as well."
A similar process is observed from the Ukrainian side, he adds. "We request the development of specific components from them, and within a week they send samples to Russia, and then start producing similar parts for them."
In the context of a protracted war, drones have become a key element of the conflict, accounting for three-quarters of recent losses. Both Russia and Ukraine are ramping up their production capabilities, relying on Chinese components.
As a result, their armies have become dependent on the same Chinese suppliers, whose developments—processors, cameras, and motors—are crucial for the range of drones and the quality of their "vision," with the cost of these elements being about one-third of the prices of Western counterparts.
Thousands of kilometers from the front lines, the supply chains of both countries intersect in faceless industrial zones and office buildings in Guangdong and Shenzhen. Here, manufacturers of small components supporting the drone war try to avoid encounters between representatives from Russia and Ukraine on their premises.
Technological innovations reach both sides almost simultaneously. "We can see a new video transmitter in Russian drones and immediately understand which Chinese company produced it," claims Alexey Babenko from Vyriy Drone, a well-known supplier to the Ukrainian armed forces. "We reach out to them, and although they initially refuse, they ultimately offer to sell it to us as well." According to him, this process also works in reverse: "When we ask them to create something for us, they send samples to Russia within a week and begin mass production for them."
Yakovенко notes that there is a bitter irony in this. On the front lines, engineers from TAF Industries often have to improvise due to a lack of spare parts, while the adversary appears well-equipped with Chinese technology.
Although China officially maintains a neutral position in the conflict and has restricted the export of sensitive drone technologies to both Russia and Ukraine, Western intelligence sources and Ukrainian politicians claim that Chinese authorities "are playing on the side of Russia," allowing wealthier Russian companies to purchase entire production lines for relocation to the country, despite existing Western sanctions and export restrictions.
Ukraine is striving for localization of drone production; however, according to Yakovenko, dependence on China still stands at about 85% for simple FPV drones, which are operated by users through onboard cameras and are often used for kamikaze attacks.
According to data from the analytical company Drone Industry Insights, China produces 70-80% of all commercial drones in the world and holds leading positions in the production of critically important components—speed controllers, sensors, cameras, and propellers.
“This clearly demonstrates how significant China's influence is on the outcome of this war,” says Katarina Buchatsky from the Kyiv military analytical center Snake Island Institute.
“China can decide whether to supply Ukraine or not. Drones have become a key weapon on the battlefield, highlighting that China has become a truly influential player.” The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the country "has always adhered to an objective and fair position on the Ukrainian crisis" and "has never supplied lethal weapons to either side of the conflict," as well as "strictly controls the export of dual-use goods, including drones."
While Moscow and Washington negotiate a difficult ceasefire, the outcome of hostilities is increasingly determined not on the front lines, but in the exhibition halls of Guangdong and Zhejiang, in WeChat chats, and in informal connections established over a glass of baijiu in hotel bars.
“It’s madness,” comments Buchatsky. “We have a hot war going on right at the border, and on another continent, both sides are sitting in the same group chat where some Chinese factory is saying, ‘The Russians pay more. Come back next year.’”
At one of the largest drone exhibitions in Shenzhen last year, Chinese companies freely interacted with buyers from Eastern Europe. The vast Shenzhen Convention and Exhibition Center showcased booths offering everything from ready-made drones to motors, cameras, software, and even robotic "dogs" with weapons.
Among more than 800 exhibitors, several companies displayed flying devices with mock-ups of guns or missiles. Despite the formally commercial nature of the exhibition, many sellers and buyers acknowledged that their primary clients were military structures.
One Russian engineer, who wished to remain anonymous, stated that he is looking for components—flight controllers, radio channels, thermal cameras, and intelligent control systems. He was part of the procurement team and added that the delivery of such devices from China is "not easy," but "we have our channels," refusing to disclose details. “The whole world hates us,” he noted, referring to the restrictions on drone supplies to Russia.
At the booth of one infrared camera manufacturer, the director stated that the company does not sell its products directly to foreign markets, explaining that exports are carried out through trading companies. “This is quite a sensitive issue,” he added, declining to provide further details.
At another exhibition in Shenzhen, held at the end of September, an employee of a Chinese component supplier reported that drones are delivered to Russia by truck through Kazakhstan, adding that customs checks there are infrequent.
China imposes restrictions on the export of dual-use goods, including various drones and their components, and has repeatedly tightened these rules since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. In September 2024, China imposed export controls on a range of products necessary for the production of combat drones, including flight controllers, carbon frames, motors, radio modules, and navigation cameras.
Nevertheless, Zhao Yan, a representative of the state-owned company Shanxi Xitou UAV Intelligent Manufacturing, acknowledges that due to the versatility of drones and the multitude of intermediaries, it is often difficult to accurately determine the end user and purpose of the products.
“We can only say… what you want to install on the drone, what lift it should provide, and if it meets the technical requirements, then that’s enough,” he reports. “If the buyer is an ordinary user and then modifies the device, that is already beyond our control.”
Other exporters express dissatisfaction that previous workarounds, such as sending drones in disassembled form for assembly on-site, have become less effective. Some large companies claim to be well-acquainted with customs procedures and obtain export licenses without issues, but smaller firms are increasingly forced to turn to expensive third-party logistics operators using complex routes.
On the first day of one of the exhibitions in Shenzhen, Financial Times journalists were approached three times by business card distributors offering the delivery of "sensitive cargo," including drones. A representative of Shunfayi International Logistics later confirmed that they have "over 20 years of experience transporting batteries and drones to Russia," and that various models of fixed-wing drones shown in photographs can still be delivered to the country.
Chinese components continue to be found in downed Russian drones. Last year, the Ukrainian armed forces published photographs of a two-stroke engine with an undamaged serial number found on a intercepted Gerbera drone. The manufacturer was identified as Mile Haoxiang Technology from Yunnan Province, although experts emphasize that the presence of Chinese parts alone does not prove targeted supplies to Russia.
They also point out that Russian drones regularly feature components from different countries. An analysis by the Kyiv Center for Defense Reforms showed that in 2025, Chinese components slightly outpaced American ones, while Swiss components ranked third.
Mile Haoxiang Technology did not provide comments.
Evelyn Buchatsky, managing partner of the Ukrainian venture fund D3, which invests in defense startups, notes that both sides easily circumvent export restrictions by, for example, creating intermediary structures in Germany or Poland.
“There are many loopholes. Ultimately, export control has only slightly increased friction in the supply chain but has not disrupted it,” she says.
Buchatsky also points out that Russia is actively engaged in "relocating" Chinese production: “They are buying entire supply chains, and since they are willing to pay more, we find ourselves at the end of the queue.”
Alexey Babenko from Vyriy Drone recalls a conversation with a Chinese factory where he was told that he can now order any number of motors that were previously unavailable. The reason, as explained, was that the Russians decided to purchase an entire production line instead of individual components and no longer needed the motors that were previously reserved for them.
Vladimir Zelensky has also pointed out that Chinese companies operate directly in Russia. “There are production lines in Russia where Chinese representatives work,” he said.
Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials have repeatedly stated that the Chinese government is assisting Russia in importing drone technologies by selectively applying its own export restrictions.
“We used to rely on Chinese Mavic drones… Now their sale to Ukraine is blocked, but remains open to Russia,” Zelensky stated in May last year. “Now our forces are producing drones independently.”
According to Babenko, Ukraine has made "significant progress" in localizing production but continues to depend on China for key components and remains vulnerable to export restrictions, complex supply routes, and political pressure.
Yakovенко adds that even if relocating Chinese production lines were possible, they would immediately become targets for Russian strikes.
Russia, using close personal ties between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, has deepened economic integration with China and mobilized state resources to ensure a more stable flow of components, including entire production chains.
“Chinese equipment, materials, and components allow Russia to establish so-called 'local' production of engines while remaining effectively tied to the Chinese technological and raw material base,” says Alexander Danilyuk from the Center for Defense Reforms.
The production of Geran and Garpiya drones, based on Iranian developments and used for long-range strikes on Ukrainian cities, has significantly increased: the number of launches rose from dozens per month in 2022 to over 5,000 per month by November.
In October 2024, the U.S. Treasury imposed sanctions on two Chinese companies—Xiamen Limbach Aircraft Engine Co and Redlepus Vector Industry Shenzhen Co—for supplying Russia with components for the production of Garpiya drones.
This sanctions package also included the Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant "Kupol," a subsidiary of the state corporation "Almaz-Antey," as well as the trading company TSK Vektor, which, according to the U.S. Treasury, "acted as an intermediary between the plant and Chinese suppliers in the Garpiya project." The Izhevsk plant, according to the agency, "coordinated the production of the Garpiya series at enterprises in China, after which the drones were transferred to Russia."
The U.S. Treasury reported that this trade was financed through regional clearing platforms that facilitated payments for sanctioned goods, and that in January 2025, sanctions were imposed on 15 such platforms.
Experts have paid particular attention to one cross-border deal that, according to analysts, would have been difficult to execute without the approval of Chinese authorities. In November, the Financial Times reported that businessman Wang Dinghua from Shenzhen owns a 5% stake in Rustakt, a manufacturer of VT-40 drones widely used by Russia. Companies Shenzhen Minghuaxin and other entities owned by Wang were major suppliers of components for Rustakt.
Other Western officials claim that the Chinese state has directly assisted Chinese sellers and Russian buyers in circumventing Western sanctions and Chinese export controls.
“We have information that a company linked to the Chinese state helped a Russian defense firm circumvent export restrictions by using a Central Asian country as a formal end user,” sources reported.
The names of the company and country were not disclosed. The January sanctions from the U.S. Treasury mention the Kyrgyzstan-based Keremet Bank as an operator of a regional clearing platform. The bank did not respond to a request for comment.
“After the U.S. Treasury disclosed information about the Russian counterparty in August 2025, we realized that Russia and China had maintained this scheme and created new front companies to circumvent further sanctions,” sources added.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry, responding to inquiries from the Financial Times, stated that it does not have relevant information, adding that Beijing, while remaining neutral regarding the war in Ukraine, "consistently opposes unilateral sanctions that lack a basis in international law and are not sanctioned by the UN Security Council," and will "resolutely defend the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese companies."
However, Sir Richard Moore, former head of British intelligence MI6, stated shortly before his resignation in September that he has no doubt that Beijing's support has played a key role in prolonging the war.
“It is precisely the support that China consistently provides to Russia—both diplomatic and in the form of dual-use goods: 'made in China' chemicals that end up in munitions and electronic components in missiles—that has prevented Putin from concluding that peace is his best option.”
